The role of awareness in differential delay eyeblink conditioning (DEC) remains controversial. Here, we investigated the involvement of awareness in differential DEC with a soft or a loud tone as the conditioned stimulus (CS). In the experiment, 36 participants were trained in differential DEC with a soft tone (60 dB) or a loud tone (85 dB) as the CS, paired with a corneal air-puff as the unconditioned stimulus (US). After conditioning, awareness of the relationship between the CS and the US was assessed with a 17-item true/false questionnaire. Interestingly, during differential DEC with a soft-tone CS, a higher proportion of differential conditioned responses (CRs) was evident in participants who were aware than those who were unaware. In contrast, when a loud tone was used as the CS, the proportion of differential CRs of the aware participants did not differ signifi cantly from those who were unaware over any of the blocks of 20 trials. In unaware participants, the percentage of differential CRs with a loud-tone CS was significantly higher than that with a soft-tone CS; however in participants classified as aware, the percentage of differential CRs with a loud-tone CS did not differ significantly from that with a soft-tone CS. The present findings suggest that awareness is critical for differential DEC when the delay task is rendered more diffi cult.
INTRODUCTION
A popular proposal in human behavior is that there are two kinds of memory, which are composed of several different abilities that depend on different brain systems [1] . One is declarative memory that is used for conscious contingency learning. The other is non-declarative memory that does not rely on consciousness and supports skill and habit learning.
In the case of associative learning, particularly Pavlovian conditioning, it is widely believed that conditioning is carried out by a refl exive, unconscious mechanism (non-declarative memory) that is quite distinct from the higher cognitive processes (declarative memory) associated with language and conscious recall of facts and events [1] . Investigations of the distinction between declarative memory and non-declarative memory are concerned with classical conditioning.
Classical conditioning of the eyeblink response serves as an excellent model in which to investigate the mechanisms of associative learning and memory in mammals [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] . In this paradigm, a conditioned stimulus (CS; e.g., a tone or light) is followed by an unconditioned stimulus (US; e.g., a corneal air-puff or periorbital shock).
At first there is only a reflexive eyeblink to the US, the unconditioned response (UR). Instead, with repeated there is a temporal gap between the CS and the US and they terminate together [9, 10] . The view is widely held that TEC is dependent on awareness [11] [12] [13] [14] . However, there is fervent debate about whether awareness is essential for DEC. Clark et al. suggested that DEC can be acquired independently, based on the evidence that differential DEC (one conditioned stimulus (CS+) is always followed by the US, and the other (CS-) is always alone) occurs in participants who show no contingency awareness [11, 15, 16] , whereas differential TEC is only acquired by participants who show awareness of the relationship between the CSs and the US [11, 17] . Signifi cantly, evidence from the data explanation of Clark and Squire has been cited as support for the distinction between declarative and non-declarative learning [18] , that TEC is associated with declarative knowledge and is mediated by the hippocampus and cortical circuits, and in contrast, DEC relies on non-declarative knowledge, which can be learned in a reflexive and automatic manner by sub-cortical or cerebellar circuits [11] .
Although the conclusions about DEC by Clark and Squire's group are dominant, a number of other eyeblink conditioning studies with respect to the relationship between DEC and contingency awareness are at odds with theirs. Previous studies [12, [19] [20] [21] have shown that differential DEC only appears in participants who know the relationship between the CSs and the US, which is consistent with the latter view that DEC is awareness-dependent. Similarly, two recent reports [13, 22] also reached the same conclusions. Thus, all these studies in favor of the latter view are opposed to the conclusions of Clark and Squire [11] .
Confronted with the inconsistency in the role of awareness underlying differential DEC, previous studies attempted to use signifi cant methodological differences to explain the difference. Some studies have pointed out that the questionnaire that Clark and Squire's group used to assess contingency awareness was not sensitive enough [23] . [24] . Unfortunately, these studies aimed at testing whether the questionnaire used by Clark et al. was sensitive by endeavoring to replicate their experimental procedures have found that the questionnaire is sensitive enough to assess contingency awareness, but showed an inconsistency in the relationship between awareness and differential DEC [13, 16] . These fi ndings not only demonstrated that the questionnaire is sensitive and cannot explain the inconsistency, but also indicated that other potential factors affect whether awareness is essential for differential DEC.
We noted that in some previous studies, one primary difference was the intensity of the CS tone used. The intensity of the CS tone in those studies that favored the awareness-dependence of differential DEC was lower than that in other studies that proposed the awarenessindependence of differential DEC (i.e. a maximum of 75 dB for awareness-dependent studies [12, 20] versus a minimum of 85 dB for awareness-independent studies [11, 16] ), suggesting that the intensity of the CS tone may affect the relationship between differential DEC and awareness. Moreover, Lovibond et al. have proposed that the intensity of the CS tone might be a critical factor underlying whether differential DEC is awareness-dependent [13] . Further, our recent study indicated that both electrolytic lesions and muscimol inactivation of the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), which is involved in many critical cognitive functions [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] , disrupt DEC with a soft-tone (60 dB) CS, but not a loud-tone (85 dB) CS in guinea pig [30] . These fi ndings led us to propose the hypothesis that awareness is critical for differential DEC with a soft-tone CS but not with a loud-tone CS. Therefore, the present study was designed to determine whether awareness is critical for differential DEC with a soft-but not with a loud-tone CS.
PARTICIPANTS AND METHODS

Participants
The participants were healthy undergraduates (36 males) with no self-reported recent hearing impairment, eye disease, or psychiatric disorder. 
Apparatus
The experiment was modeled on the procedure of Clark and Squire (1998) [11] . We also used the same silent movie [The Gold Rush (Chaplin, 1925)] [11] as a masking task, and an infrared emitter/detector (FBCB30/TBBB30, Heng Sheng, Shenzhen, China) attached to spectacles for eyeblink recording. We chose two differential DEC paradigms that used a soft (60 dB) or loud (85 dB) tone CS paired with a corneal air-puff US ( The presentations of the CS and US were controlled by a self-made computer system [30] . A data-acquisition system (RM6240BDJ, Cheng Yi, Chengdu, China) was used to digitize markers of the applied stimuli and the eyeblinks, and the data were acquired by the system software (v. 4.7).
The storage and analysis of data were carried out on a dedicated Windows PC.
Behavioral Procedure
The experimental procedures were similar to those used in previous studies [11, 16] . In the period of conditioning, participants watched the silent movie, and were asked to learn its content for a later recall test. Participants were told they would be taking part in a study about the effects of distraction on learning and memory and they would be distracted by a high-frequency tone (3 kHz), a lowfrequency (1 kHz) tone, and air puffs [11] . After participants fully understood the instructions, they put on the modified spectacles and watched the movie on the computer monitor. When the conditioning session fi nished, we tested the participants' grasp of the movie content and asked them to carefully complete a questionnaire. This consisted of 17 items concerning the CS-US correlation (e.g., "I believe the air-puff usually came immediately after the low tone." and "I believe the low tone predicted when the air-puff would come."), as in previous studies [11, 16] .
Behavioral Data Analysis
On each CS+ or CS-trial, a 3100-ms epoch was recorded, starting 800 ms before the onset of the CS (Fig. 1 ). All the eyeblink data came from the left eye. The parameters of the present study were similar to those used by Smith (2005) [16] and were analyzed with custom software. Each CS+ trial was subdivided into three discontinuous analysis periods: (1) a "baseline" period, 1-800 ms before the CS onset; (2) a "CR" period, 750-1 250 ms after the CS onset;
and (3) a "UR" period, 1-500 ms after the US onset (Fig. 1) .
Moreover, for each CS-trial, the "baseline" period and the "CR" period were the same as in the CS+ trial.
Based on the parameters used by Smith (2005) [16] , the defi nition of a CR had to meet the following two conditions:
first, the eyeblink must occur between 750 and 1250 ms after the CS onset (CR+ for CS+ trials and CR-for CStrials); and second, the amplitude of the CR must exceed the baseline threshold (i.e., no less than 20% of the average amplitude of the fi rst 10 URs in CS+ trials). During each block of 20 trials, the percentage of CR+ or CR-was defi ned as the ratio of the number of trials containing the CR+ or CR-to the total number of CS+ trials or CS-trials, respectively. Based on a previous study [11] , the percentage of differential CR (differential CR%) was defined as the percentage of CR+ minus the percentage of CR-.
Following Clark and Squire's study (1998) [11] , participants were defined as being aware or unaware of the stimulus contingencies across the scores of the 17-item questionnaire. When the score was ≥13 correct out of 17, participants were defined as aware of the stimulus contingencies. When the score was ≤12 correct, participants were defi ned as unaware of the stimulus contingencies.
Statistical Analysis
All the data are expressed as the mean ± standard error of the mean (SEM). Statistical signifi cance was determined by least signifi cant difference (LSD) post hoc tests, following two-way repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVA) and a separate one-way repeated measures ANOVA using the SPSS for Windows package (v. 18.0). P <0.05 was considered to be statistically signifi cant [30] .
RESULTS
Number of Correct Responses to Post-experimental
Questionnaire
The performances of all aware and unaware individuals in answering the 17 questions of the post-experimental questionnaire concerning the temporal relationships between the CS+, the CS-, and the US are shown in Table 1 .
Effects of Awareness on Differential DEC with a Soft-Tone CS
Compared with that in the aware/soft group, the acquisition of differential DEC with a soft-tone CS was significantly impaired in the unaware/soft group ( Fig. 2A) . This was confirmed by two-way repeated measures ANOVA on the differential CR%; there was no significant group-by-block 
Effects of Awareness on Differential DEC with a Loud-
Tone CS
We then asked whether differential DEC with a loud-tone CS depends on awareness. There was no signifi cant group 
Effects of CS Tone Intensity on Differential DEC in Unaware Participants
In unaware participants, the differential CR% with a loudtone CS was signifi cantly higher than that with a soft-tone CS (Fig. 2C) . Statistical analysis using two-way repeated measures ANOVA revealed no significant group-by-block 
Effects of CS Tone Intensity on Differential DEC in
Aware Participants
In participants classified as aware, the CR% with a loudtone CS did not differ signifi cantly from that with a soft-tone CS (Fig. 2D ). This was confirmed by two-way repeated 
DISCUSSION
The original goal of the present study was to investigate our hypothesis that awareness is essential for differential DEC when a soft tone but not a loud tone is used as the CS.
The following findings appear to support our hypothesis:
(1) in the soft-tone CS trials, the acquisition of differential contingent awareness is not critical for differential DEC [11, 15, 16] , whereas the present results on differential DEC with a soft-tone CS are entirely consistent with the view of other studies that differential DEC only appears in participants who have contingency awareness [12, 19, 20] .
Why is contingency awareness essential for differential DEC with a soft-tone CS but not a loud-tone CS? Although the present data have not directly answered this question, evidence from our recent study [30] on DEC in experimental animals with mPFC lesions may be cited in this regard.
This study showed that lesions of the mPFC, forebrain structures involved in awareness formation [31] [32] [33] , induce deficits in acquisition of the CR with a soft-tone CS, but not a loud-tone CS [30] . While the concept of conscious knowledge is not readily applicable to experimental animals, it is believed that the critical element that confers awareness about acquired knowledge comes from the conjoint operation of the neocortex and the hippocampal system [11] . Accordingly, it can be reasoned that the animals with mPFC lesions in our previous study failed to acquire contingency awareness.
It has been demonstrated that during the tone stimulation of eyeblink conditioning, only a small percentage of auditory-driven mossy fi bers show sustained responses that persist until the CS tone offset even when a loud tone is used [34] [35] [36] , therefore, the soft-tone CS may drive much less sustained mossy-fiber activity, which is essential for the integration and processing of CS and US information during conditioning. Fortunately, sustained responses may also be driven by input from other sources such as the mPFC [37] and hippocampus [38, 39] ; in this case, with input from these forebrain areas, mossy-fi ber activity driven by the soft-tone CS may also effectively support eyeblink conditioning. In contrast, it would be insuffi cient to support the CR if there were no signal input from the mPFC or hippocampus due to their inactivation or lesioning.
Our fi nding that differential DEC with a loud-tone CS did not depend on awareness differs from the results of two recent studies [13, 22] with the same loud-tone CS, in which differential DEC was reported to be awareness-dependent.
Although it is not clear what underlying differences of procedure might be responsible for this inconsistency, some possible candidates should be taken into account. One possible factor is the way awareness is assessed. Lovibond et al. [13] used two questionnaires, a long one, based on Clark and Squire (1998) [11] , and a short one, based on the recommendations of Dawson and Reardon (1973) [40] . In addition, Weidemann et al. [22] used a button-press measure of expectancy of the US rather than the long questionnaire, whereas the participants in our study were only given the long questionnaire based on Clark and Squire (1998) [11] .
The button-press measure may reinforce the contingency awareness of CS-US during experiments, hence affecting the results. Another possible factor is that the pressure of the air-puff in these two studies was higher than that in our study (15 psi [13, 22] vs 5 psi). Indeed, some recent studies on animals have shown that TEC is affected more by lesions of the mPFC when a relatively non-aversive airpuff, rather than an aversive periorbital shock, is used as the US [41] [42] [43] , implying that the intensity of the US may be an important factor affecting the results in differential DEC studies. This hypothesis needs to be further tested. Anyway, assessing awareness using the questionnaire of Clark and Squire (1998) [11] , our results suggested that differential DEC is not dependent on awareness when a loud tone is used as the CS, paired with a 5-psi, 100-ms air-puff US.
In conclusion, we showed that awareness is critical for differential DEC when the delay task is rendered more diffi cult. Moreover, the results also provide a way to interpret the long-standing argument on whether differential DEC is awareness-dependent.
